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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
. FIlED IN OFFICE 
MAY - 8 2008 
JAMES & JACKSON LLC, individually and ) 
derivatively on behalf of MBC, GOSPEL ) OfEPUTY ClERK'SU'PERIOR COURr FULTON OOUNTY GA . 
NETWORK, LLC., ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
EVANDER HOLYFIELD, JR., WILLIE E. 
GARY, CECIL FIELDER, LORENZO 
WILLIAMS, THOMAS WEIKSNAR, CHAN 












Civil Action No.: 2006CV124372 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Strike portions of Plaintiff's 
First Amended Complaint. Specifically, Defendants petition this Court to strike Plaintiff's 
characterizations of the Delaware proceeding between it and Willie Gary, LLC over MBC as 
instructing, determining, or deciding that MBC should be judicially dissolved and an auction 
conducted. 
A motion to strike is governed by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(f) where a party may move 
"within 30 days after the service of the pleading upon him" to strike "from any pleading any 
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(f) models the language of Section 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, thus federal cases addressing motions to strike may be relevant to this Court's 
analysis. Contrary to Defendants' position, however, Georgia's case law is clear that a 
motion to strike made by counsel outside of the 30 day window expressly provided in 
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(f) is untimely. Potpourri of Merrick. Inc .. v. Gay Gibson, Inc., 132 Ga. 
1 
App. 565,566 (1974) CAs the motion here was not made within 30 days of service upon 
plaintiff, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike these defenses, even if they 
were legally insufficient."). Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Strike is hereby DENIED as 
untimely filed. 
In addition, Defendants urge the Court, under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(f), to strike 
language from a pleading "upon a Court's own initiative at any time". Thus, the Court will 
review Plaintiff's Complaint to determine if any language is "redundant, immaterial, 
impertinent, or scandalous." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-12(f). 
As highlighted by Defendants, the Court focused upon the portions of the Complaint 
construing the Delaware action as recommending judicial dissolution of MBC. After carefully 
reviewing the portions of the Delaware Chancery Court transcripts provided, it is clear that 
the Chancery Court contemplated either a mediated resolution of the dispute or dissolution of 
MBC, possibly through an auction (rather than a put or call option). The transcripts of the 
proceedings convey that dissolution was a very real possibility and that the parties were 
taking initial steps to investigate and structure an auction to facilitate it. It is also important to 
note that at the time of the Delaware action, Willie Gary, LLC was the party requesting judicial 
dissolution. 
While Plaintiff's characterization in its Compliant in this action that Chancellor Strine 
"instructed", "determined", or "decided" that dissolution and an auction were the appropriate 
remedies for the parties is an extrapolation of the direction of the case, it is also typical 
puffing and posturing found in pleadings. It is not, however, grounds to strike the pleadings 
because such characterizations are not patently false, nor, is it clear that the Delaware action 
will "have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of the litigation .... " Medlin v. 
2 
Carpenter, 174 Ga. App. 50, 55, (1985); see also Smith v. Morris. Manning. & Martin, 254 
Ga. App. 355, 357 (2002) (Upholding a trial court's order to strike language in a pleading 
because it was "patently false and [a] sham pleading"). Because such motions are not 
favored in Georgia and the case law urges the Court to exercise caution in striking pleadings, 
the Court declines the opportunity to act "upon its own initiative" and strike Plaintiffs 
Complaint. See Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McGivern, 132 Ga. App. 297, 302 (1974) 
(holding that "if there is any doubt as to whether under any contingency the matter may raise 
an issue, the motion should be denied ... "). 
SO ORDERED this <2, day of May, 2008. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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